Pahalgam Terror Attack: India Can Retaliate By Suspending The Indus Waters Treaty, Which Can Put Pakistan's Water Security Under Threat

Pakistan failed to read the writing on the wall. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) had been red-flagged by India as an aberrant legacy of the Nehruvian era, which not only privileged Pakistan but also did not factor in national security. India issued notices to Pakistan on the treaty in 2023 and 2024, to no avail. The Pahalgam terrorist strike was bound to invite the suspension of the treaty.

Under the Modi government, there has been a palpable policy shift in favour of the view that a treaty obliging India to protect Pakistan’s interests cannot endure if the latter sponsors terrorism on Indian soil, as it has done since the 1980s. Adhering to an international rules-based order is desirable but cannot be unilateral.

In the words of geostrategist Brahma Chellaney, the IWT is “the most generous water-sharing agreement in modern world history”, in that it allots to Pakistan, the lower riparian state, an 80.5 per cent share of the waters of the Indus River system. Not only is the treaty heavily weighted in favour of Pakistan, but it has effectively prevented India from harnessing the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—even for permissible uses, such as generating hydropower through run-of-the-river dams. The Kishanganga I project, first mooted in 1988, was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi only in 2018, thanks to constant objections from Pakistan.

Why does Pakistan dub the halt of the IWT as an ‘act of war’, and why has it, over the years, used the treaty to stall India’s projects on the Jhelum and the Chenab? In a phrase, hydraulic warfare. This is an age-old strategy involving the denial of water supply or a deliberate release of water to cause flooding by an upper riparian state or invading force in control of surface water channels.

Does India have the ability to engage in hydraulic warfare? Yes, to some extent. One of Pakistan’s concerns regarding the Kishanganga project on the Jhelum was that it would reduce water-flow into PoK, thereby adversely impacting agriculture. Another was that drawdown flushing of sediment from the dam could flood the downstream areas in Pakistan. Within days of the suspension of the IWT, Pakistan claimed India had discharged water without warning, causing a sudden surge in the Jhelum.

Those in favour of the IWT have argued that India cannot and should not block water flows into Pakistan. Granted, the “not one drop of water to Pakistan” rhetoric is purely for effect and isn’t practicable, because the difficulties of the terrain make large-scale dams and water storage impossible. But that cannot and should not prevent India from flexing its hydraulic muscle in the short to medium term.

The suspension of the IWT allows India not only to maintain the existing dams (by drawdown flushing) but also to go full steam ahead with multiple run-of-the-river hydroelectricity projects on the Jhelum and Chenab, which are either underway or in the planning stage. These dams are permitted even under the IWT and, once completed, give India the option of delaying water flows into Pakistan long enough to adversely impact crop growth.

Second, by not sharing hydrological data, such as information on volume of flow, melting of glaciers and possible floods, India undermines Pakistan’s ability to manage water resources. Third, India can work towards creating storage infrastructure to utilise its full entitlement of 3.6 million acre-feet from the western rivers and not allow surplus water from the eastern rivers to flow across the border. All three measures will have negative consequences for Pakistan.

In the long term, India could expand its infrastructure to significantly reduce cross-border water flows. That prospect spells disaster for Pakistan, which is unclear on how to respond. Its counter-threat of litigation is an empty one. The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction in such matters, nor does the World Bank. By refusing to engage constructively with India on the IWT despite multiple warnings, Pakistan has effectively painted itself into a corner.

India first rattled its sabre in 2016 when, in the wake of the Uri attack that claimed the lives of 18 soldiers, PM Modi declared that “Blood and water can't flow together at the same time”. Subsequently, India twice served notice on Pakistan seeking a modification of the treaty but was ignored. Now, Pakistan’s water security is under threat.

The obvious question is why India chose to sustain the IWT for so long, through decades of war and terrorism. A combination of factors may have been at play, such as a reluctance to fuel tensions and the remote possibility that China might come to the defence of its ally by restricting the Brahmaputra flows (both the Indus and Brahmaputra rise in Tibet). The latter seems unlikely, as China has significant interests in India. It already has a run-of-the-river dam on the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, and both India and China are planning mega-dams on the river.

The fact is that India has run out of patience. It has weighed the costs and benefits of suspending the IWT and decided on a no-holds-barred approach. Pakistan somehow did not see it coming, and its frightened leadership fell back on hollow threats of nuclear strikes. Halting of trade with India will weigh heavily on its already battered economy and has already fuelled a sudden spike in food prices, according to news reports. In terms of retaliation, India need not even consider a military option; keeping a hand on the tap is enough.

Bhavdeep Kang is a senior journalist with 35 years of experience in working with major newspapers and magazines. She is now an independent writer and author